← AI-Generated Economics Papers

The Triffin Margin: Who Absorbs Treasury Supply, and What It Costs

Claude

October 1, 2026 · NBER style · 73 pages

A 73-page NBER-style working paper asking who absorbs a dollar of new Treasury coupon supply and what it costs in yield, built from every coupon auction's investor-class allotments since 2000, the monthly and weekly records of official holdings, and a new series on holder composition by maturity bucket. The marginal dollar at auction is divided among investor classes roughly as the average dollar is, while the official sector absorbed the anticipated path of issuance when it was accumulating reserves (2000 to 2008) and not since 2014; the pre-registered announcement-surprise test has no first stage because Treasury's guidance removes the news, and the paper reports that in full. A multi-bucket preferred-habitat model with a quantity-inelastic official sector is calibrated so the fall in the official share lowers the yield cost of a supply surprise by a factor between 0.63 and one, which the daily data cannot pin down. The PDF, the LaTeX source and package, and the process memo are attached; a replication package is in the repo.

The paper (PDF)Process memoLaTeX sourceReplication package

The prompt that produced this paper, verbatim

The Triffin margin: who absorbs Treasury supply, and what it costs. Does the yield cost of absorbing a dollar of new Treasury supply depend on whether the marginal buyer is a reserve manager or a private investor? The paper writes a two-buyer version of the Farhi-Maggiori hegemon model: an official sector whose demand is set by reserve needs and barely responds to price, and a private sector that pays a convenience premium but is price-elastic. The comparative static is that the yield response to a supply shock rises as the official share of the stock falls, and the model is calibrated so the implied elasticities are passport numbers. The test interacts the Phillot (2025) high-frequency Treasury supply shocks, identified from futures moves in the minutes around auction-size announcements, with the foreign-official share from TIC and the Financial Accounts, 2000 to 2025. Because the official share has fallen from roughly two fifths of the market after 2008 to under a fifth, a plain time interaction is an exogenous shock times a trend, so the identification comes from the cross-section of maturity buckets within each announcement window, where the official share differs sharply and the time trend is differenced out, and the interaction is shown to beat a time-varying coefficient before any magnitude is quoted. Bi, Phillot and Zubairy (2025) show the response is larger when debt is growing fast; Jansen, Li and Schmid (2024) and the granular-instrumental-variable work assign yield impact to the official sector and find its demand the least elastic; a Kansas City Fed note (Dilts Stedman 2025) asserts that composition now matters. The increment is the model-implied interaction with an exogenous supply shock, which none of them estimates. A referee would write: the paper turns the slogan that the Treasury market has become more price-sensitive into an estimated, model-implied interaction, and the magnitude is the one a debt manager and a CBO interest-cost projection would plug in.

This is a fresh, full-length NBER build of this pitch (a first build, delivered 2026-10-01 as paper-triffin-margin, came out short: a one-bucket model with one proposition, no related-literature section, four figures, and two referee rounds saying the quantity-based daily-window test could not carry the question, answered by an honest null). Build the full paper to the venue floors: a two-bucket or multi-asset model with at least three propositions, a calibration and a quantitative exercise; a standalone related-literature section; two distinct estimation approaches for the headline interaction, with the full robustness battery drawn as well as tabled. The Phillot high-frequency shock series sits behind an openICPSR login the engine cannot pass, so construct a supply-shock series with a demonstrable first stage from data the house serves (announcement-window yield or futures moves, auction sizes versus Treasury guidance, or the refunding-statement path), compare it with the quantity surprise, and let the loop-back rule govern what the referees find. Reuse nothing from the first build except what the Library already holds.

Written by Claude, may contain mistakes. Jason makes this free and would appreciate any feedback.